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INTRODUCTION
The screech of a siren disrupts a calm suburban neighborhood air
as a police cruiser pulls up along the sidewalk. Two young men,
unremarkable in most ways, freeze. An officer jumps out of the
passenger side of the vehicle. Residents of the nearby apartment
complex peer out their windows as the officer directs the men to place
their hands above their heads. The officer recites the Miranda warning
as he handcuffs the suspects. His partner opens the back door of the
vehicle and they place the young men inside.
The preceding paragraph details an arrest and nothing more. An
inquisitive observer may ask themselves why these men were placed
under arrest. Are they suspected of committing a crime? Are they
guilty? Perhaps they just have the unfortunate luck of matching the
wrong description? But the answers to these questions are not included
in the paragraph above. The answers to these questions are irrelevant.
Regardless of what the young men did or did not do, regardless of
their eventual guilt or innocence, the two young men in the above
 J.D. candidate, May 2015, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology.
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scenario were placed under arrest. Had this arrest of taken place in the
Village of Woodridge in early 2011, these young men would have been
required to pay a $30.00 booking fee. They would have been required
to pay this fee without any form of a pre-depravation hearing, and
without any opportunity to challenge the fee or seek reimbursement.
In Markadonatos v. Village of Woodridge,1 the Seventh Circuit
looked at whether this required booking fee was a violation of either
procedural or substantive due process. The procedural claim hinged on
opposing arguments regarding the risk of erroneous deprivation under
the ordinance. The substantive claim turned on whether, and to what
degree, the petitioner had standing. Judge Hamilton decried the
“substantive due process detour,”2 stating that under the procedural
issue the deprivation was always erroneous due to inability of the
arrestee to contest the fee. In determining the question of standing for
the substantive claim, the courts relied heavily on the issues of
probable cause for the arrest and the petitioner’s eventual criminal
proceedings. Judge Hamilton faulted his co-judges for their reliance of
these facts as those matters remained irrelevant in the accessing of the
booking fee.
Judge Hamilton’s opinion that the booking fee was a violation of
due process was correct and should have been adopted by the court.
Requiring the payment of a booking fee upon arrest in the absence of
any procedural process is a violation of procedural due process.
The Seventh Circuit granted a rehearing en banc vacating the
panel opinion, however, because no position by the en banc court
commanded a majority, the judgment of the district court to grant
Woodridge’s Motion to Dismiss was affirmed.3
Part I discusses the factual and procedural background of the
Markandonatos cases, and will provide a brief history of procedural
and substantive due process jurisprudence. Part II reviews the two
district court opinions, the two Seventh Circuit opinions, and their
1

Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge (Markadonatos III), 739 F.3d 984 (7th
Cir. 2014).
2
Id. at 995.
3
Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge (Markadonatos IV), 760 F.3d 545 (7th
Cir. 2014).
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corresponding concurrences and dissents relating to this matter.
Finally, part III analyzes why Judge Hamilton was correct and why the
Seventh Circuit should have adopted his analysis.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
On January 8, 2011, the petitioner, Jerry Markadonatos was
arrested for shoplifting, an Illinois Class A misdemeanor, in the Village
of Woodridge, Illinois.4 At the time, Woodridge had enacted Municipal
Code 5-1-12(A), which imposed a $30.00 booking fee on any person
subject to a custodial arrest.5 The Woodridge, Illinois, Municipal Code
5-1-12 provided in pertinent part:
“The fees for the following activities and purposes shall be as
follows:
A. Booking Fee: When posting bail or bond on any legal
process, civil or criminal, or any custodial arrest including
warrant $30.00.”6
Woodridge collected this booking fee without any hearings, and did
not offer arrestees any opportunity to challenge the deprivation or seek
reimbursement.7 When Mr. Markadonatos arrived at the police station,
he paid the booking fee, posted bond, and was released without being
jailed.8
Eventually, Mr. Markadonatos was ordered to undergo 12 months
of court supervision and to pay fees and fines totaling $785 (not

4

Markadonatos IV, 760 F.3d at 545.
Markadonatos III, 739 F.3d at 986.
6
Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge (Markadonatos I), No. 11 C 7006, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3115, at *n. 1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2012).
7
Id.
8
Markadonatos IV, 760 F.3d at 545.
5
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including the $30 booking fee).9 Upon successful completion of his
supervision, Mr. Markadonatos charges were to be dismissed “without
adjudication of guilt,” pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.1(f).10 Despite the
favorable adjudication, Mr. Markadonatos was never given an
opportunity to contest the booking fee and Woodridge’s policy
provided no means for a refund regardless of the outcome of the
arrestee’s case.11
B. Procedural Background12
On October 4, 2011, Mr. Markadonatos filed a suit on behalf of
himself and all of the arrestees who had been charged the booking fee,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,13 arguing that Woodridge violated their
right to procedural due process.14 On January 6, 2012, the district court
granted Woodridge’s Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.15
9

Id. at 546.
“Discharge and dismissal upon a successful conclusion of a disposition of
supervision shall be deemed without adjudication of guilt and shall not be termed a
conviction for purposes of disqualification or disabilities imposed by law upon
conviction of a crime . . . .” 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.1(f).
11
Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge (Markadonatos II), No. 11 C 7006,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83128, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2012).
12
This section is meant to provide a brief overview of the procedural history of
this matter. A more in depth look at the opinions and holdings in each case can be
found in part II of this article.
13
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action
brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree
was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983
14
Markadonatos II, No. 11 C 7006, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83128, at *1.
15
Id. at *1-2.
10
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Mr. Markadonatos was granted leave and filed his First Amended
Complaint raising both procedural due process and substantive due
process challenges.16 On June 11, 2012, that district court again
granted Woodridge’s Motion to Dismiss.17 Mr. Markadonatos appealed
to the Seventh Circuit arguing that the district court erred in
dismissing his amended complaint.18 On January 8, 2014, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the ruling to the district court granting Woodridge’s
Motion to Dismiss.19 Mr. Markadonatos petitioned for and was granted
a rehearing en banc.20
On July 21, 2014, the Seventh Circuit issued a divided opinion.21
Judges Posner, Flaum, and Kanne interpreted Woodridge’s ordinance
to apply only to individuals posting bail or bond and voted to affirm
the judgment of the district court.22 Judges Easterbrook and Tinder
also voted to affirm and opined that Mr. Markadonatos’ claim should
be categorized as a substantive due process claim and that Mr.
Markadonatos only had standing to contest the application of the
ordinance to persons arrested with probable cause.23
Judge Sykes voted to remand with instruction to dismiss the case
for want of standing to sue.24 She opined that Mr. Markadonatos
lacked standing to contest the application of the ordinance under either
procedural or substantive due process claims since he was lawfully
arrested with probable cause.25 The final four judges, Judges
Hamilton, Wood, Rovner, and Williams, opined that Mr. Markadonatos
had standing and voted to reverse the judgment of the district court.26
16

Id. at *2.
Id.
18
Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge (Markadonatos III), 739 F.3d 984, 987
(7th Cir. 2014).
19
Id.
20
Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge (Markadonatos IV), 760 F.3d 545, 546
(7th Cir. 2014).
21
Id. at 545.
22
Id. at 551.
23
Id. at 554-55.
24
Id. at 562.
25
Id. at 556.
26
Id. at 545.
17
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Since no group constituted a majority, the district court’s judgment
was affirmed.27
C. Due Process
The origin of due process dates back to the drafting of Magna
Carta in 1215 in which clause 39 stated, “No free man shall be taken,
outlawed, banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will We proceed
against or prosecute him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers
and by the law of the land.”28 As early as 1354, the words “due process
of law” were used in English statutes interpreting the Magna Carta.29
By the end of the 14th century “due process of law” and “law of the
land” were interchangeable.30
This basic principle was incorporated into early state
constitutions31 and eventually it was included in the Fifth Amendment
of the United States Constitution which states that “No person
shall…be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law…”32 The Fourteenth Amendment further extended this principle to
the states.33
1. Procedural Due Process
The Supreme Court has held that there are two steps when
examining a procedural due process claim.34 First, the court must
determine if there is a liberty or property interest within the meaning
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment that
has been interfered with by the state.35 Second, the court must
27

Id.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 169 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
29
Id. (citing 28 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1354)).
30
Id.
31
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921).
32
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
33
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
34
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
35
Id. at 332.
28
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determine if the administrative procedures leading to the deprivation
of the interest are constitutionally sufficient.36
In determining if the administrative procedures are
constitutionally sufficient, the court considers three factors: first, the
private interest that is affected; second, the risk of erroneous
deprivation of the interest through the procedures used and any value
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
government’s interest.37
In Eldridge, the Court looked at whether the due process required
the recipient be afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing
prior to the termination of Social Security disability benefit
payments.38 A recipient whose benefits are terminated is allowed to
seek reconsideration from the state agency after termination.39 Since a
recipient is awarded full retroactive relief if they ultimately prevail,
the private interest affected is only in the uninterrupted receipt of
Social Security disability benefit payments.40 The Court noted that
while the hardship imposed upon the erroneously terminated disability
recipient may be significant, Social Security is not based on financial
need and recipients still have access to private resources or other
forms of government assistance should the termination of benefits
place the recipient’s family below the subsistence level.41 Therefore, a
brief interruption of benefits due to erroneous deprivation would not
be so significant as to depart from the Court’s ordinary principle that
something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to
adverse administrative action.42
In determining the risk of erroneous deprivation, the Court noted
that the decision to discontinue disability benefits is determined by a
medical assessment based on routine, standard, and unbiased medical

36

Id. at 334.
Id. at 335.
38
Id. at 323.
39
Id. at 324.
40
Id. at 340.
41
Id. at 342.
42
Id.
37
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reports by physician specialists.43 Since the procedural due process
rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth finding
process of the procedures provided, the Court held that the potential
value of an evidentiary hearing in this context would be minimal.44
Finally, the Court looked at the government’s interest, which was
the burden of the incremental cost resulting from the increased number
of hearings and the expense of providing benefits to ineligible
recipients pending decisions.45 Since the resources available for social
welfare programs are not unlimited and since it is unlikely that
undeserved benefits would be recoverable by the Social Security
Administration, the Court opined that the government interest would
not be insubstantial.46
The Court held that balancing these three factors an evidentiary
hearing was not required prior to the termination of disability benefits
and that the present administrative procedures, including procedures
that provide recipients with an effective process for asserting their
claim prior to administrative action, the right to an evidentiary hearing,
and subsequent judicial review before the denial becomes final, fully
comported with due process.47 In doing so, the Court noted that the
essence of due process is the requirement that an individual in
jeopardy of serious loss be given notice of the case against him and the
opportunity to meet it.48
2. Substantive Due Process
The Supreme Court has held that substantive due process protects
fundamental rights and liberties which are so “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition,”49 that “neither liberty nor justice would

43

Id. at 343-344.
Id. at 344.
45
Id. at 347.
46
Id. at 347-48.
47
Id. at 348-49.
48
Id. at 348.
49
Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
44
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exist if they were sacrificed.”50 If the governmental practice does not
encroach upon a fundamental right, the Constitution only requires that
the practice be rationally related to a legitimate government interest. 51
Essentially, the governmental practice cannot be arbitrary or
irrational.52
II. MARKADONATOS V. VILLAGE OF WOODRIDGE
A. District Court’s Original Holding
The original complaint alleged only that Woodridge violated
procedural due process by imposing the $30 booking fee without
applying appropriate procedures.53 Woodridge moved to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.54 Under the legal standard developed in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly55 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,56 a complaint must
include sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.57 Thus, the district court
applied the test set out in Eldridge to determine if Markadonatos’
claims, if true, made out a plausible procedural due process
violation.58
Since the parties agreed that Mr. Markadonatos had a property
interest in his money the court moved on to the second step of the
Eldridge test, determining whether the procedures regarding the
deprivation of Mr. Markadonatos’ property interest were
50

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
Id. at 728.
52
Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 467 (7th Cir. 2003).
53
Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge (Markadonatos I), No. 11 C 7006, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3115, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2012).
54
Id. at *1.
55
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
56
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
57
Id. at 678.
58
Markadonatos I, No. 11 C 7006, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3115, at *3-4.
51
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constitutionally sufficient.59 The court considered the three factors
enumerated in Eldridge.60
First, the court looked at Mr. Markadonatos’ private interest in the
61
$30. The court concluded that the amount was small when compared
to the types of interests that typically require a pre-deprivation
hearing.62 Specifically the judge pointed to Sickles v. Campbell
County63 and Eldridge in concluding that any monetary interest short
of income constituting the sole means of an individual’s subsistence
should only be given minimal weight.64
Second, the court looked at the risk of erroneous deprivation and
the potential value of additional or substitute procedures.65 Mr.
Markadonatos argued that since an arrestee who paid the fee could
later be found innocent or released without facing charges that
erroneous deprivation is certain in at least some cases.66 The district
court disagreed. Since the fee applied to all arrestees regardless of
guilt, the court noted that the only risk of erroneous deprivation would
be if someone who was not arrested was charged the fee.67 Since
Woodridge administration made the determination that an individual
was arrested, and thus owed the fee, at the time the individual was
booked into jail, the chances of charging someone with the fee who
was not arrested was zero.68 Further, the court noted that substitute
procedures would not provide additional safeguards or decrease the
already negligible risk of erroneous deprivation.69

59

Id. at *5.
Id. at *5-6.
61
Id. at *6.
62
Id.
63
501 F.3d 726 (6th Cir. 2007) (evaluating the private interest in room and
board fees deducted from incarcerated individuals canteen accounts).
64
Markadonatos I, No. 11 C 7006, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3115, at *7-8.
65
Id. at *8.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
60
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Finally, the court looked to the government interest in defraying
administrative costs in processing arrestees.70 The court held that
Woodridge’s interest was legitimate.71 However, like Mr.
Markadonatos’ private interest in the money, Woodridge’s interest in
such a small amount of money was also minimal.72
Upon balancing these factors, the court determined that the
dispositive factor was the nonexistent risk of erroneous deprivation.73
The court held that since there was no risk that Woodridge would
charge the fee to an individual who was not arrested, and since no
alternative procedures would significantly decrease that risk,
Woodridge’s current procedures were constitutional.74 Thus, the
district court held that Mr. Markadonatos failed to state a claim that
Woodridge violated his procedural due process rights.75
B. District Court’s Holding on First Amended Complaint
Concurrently with his first dismissal, the district court granted Mr.
Markadonatos leave to amend his complaint.76 The factual allegations
in the complaint remained unchanged but Mr. Markadonatos now
brought both procedural and substantive due process claims.77
Since Mr. Markadonatos did not add any additional factual
allegations the court held that his procedural due process claim was
barred by the law of the case doctrine.78 However, the court noted that
even upon reconsideration, Mr. Markadonatos’ procedural claim

70

Id. at *10
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at *11.
75
Id.
76
Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge (Markadonatos II), No. 11 C 7006,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83128, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2012).
77
Id.
78
The law of the case doctrine “expresses the practice of courts generally to
refuse to reopen what has been decided.” Id. at *4. (quoting Messenger v. Anderson,
225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912)).
71
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would still fail.79 Mr. Markadonatos attempted to clarify his procedural
due process claim by pointing out that the Eldridge test was meant to
determine what procedures are required prior to deprivation, and
should not be applied in a way the indicates the absence of any
procedure at all is acceptable.80 The court pointed out that Woodridge
did provide minimal process before charging the fee.81 Specifically,
the court noted that the fee was applied at the time of booking and any
individual would be able to point out any error at that time.82 The court
noted that a person who was not actually under arrest would simply
have to convey that information to avoid erroneous deprivation.83
Next, the court examined Mr. Markadonatos’ substantive due
process claim.84 The court noted that property interest in a $30
booking fee was not a fundamental right, and thus the proper analysis
under substantive due process for this case was the rational basis test.85
The court noted that under the rational basis test, the court must ask if
Woodridge’s practice of charging a booking fee to all arrestees,
regardless of legality of the arrest or the disposition of the arrestee’s
case, is arbitrary or irrational.86
The court held that Mr. Markadonatos lacked the standing to
challenge the rationality of Woodridge’s policy under the substantive
due process claim for individuals who may have been arrested without
probable cause or released without being charged because Mr.

79

Id. at *7-8.
Id. at *8. “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to
be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
81
Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge (Markadonatos II), No. 11 C 7006,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83128, at *9 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2012).
82
Id.
83
Id. at *9-10.
84
Id. at *10.
85
Id. at *12-13. “[T]he Supreme Court has never held that a property interest
so modest is a fundamental right.” Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564, 566 (7th
Cir. 2009). (explaining there is no fundamental right involved in a small sum such as
a $90 traffic fine).
86
Markadonatos II, No. 11 C 7006, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83128 at *13.
80

319
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol10/iss2/4

12

Fox: Procedural Error? Seventh Circuit Fails to Recognize “No Procedur

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 10, Issue 2

Spring 2015

Markadonatos was arrested with probable cause and was charged.87
Instead, the court noted that Mr. Markadonatos could only challenge
the rationality of the policy as it applied to individuals arrested with
probable cause, charged with crimes, and subjected to conviction.88
The court held that charging booking fees to such arrestees was
rational since Woodridge had a legitimate interest in defraying the cost
of such arrests, and it was rational for Woodridge to share the cost of
incarceration with the individuals who, through their actions,
necessitated those costs.89 Since Woodridge’s fees were rational as
applied to Mr. Markadonatos, the court granted Woodridge’s motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim.90
C. Seventh Circuit’s Panel Opinion
1. Opinion of the Court
After his second dismissal, Mr. Markadonatos appealed to the
Seventh Circuit arguing that the district court erred in dismissing his
amended complaint.91 First, the Seventh Circuit Court looked to the
issue of standing.92 The court noted there are essentially three
elements for standing.93 First, the plaintiff must have suffered an
“injury in fact,” requiring an invasion of the plaintiff’s legally
protected interest that is both concrete and particularized and actual or
imminent.94 Second, the injury must have been caused by the conduct
complained of.95 Third, it must be likely that a decision in the
plaintiff’s favor would redress his injury.96
87

Id. at *13-14.
Id. at *14.
89
Id. at *14-15.
90
Id. at *15.
91
Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge (Markadonatos III), 739 F.3d 984, 987
(7th Cir. 2014).
92
Id. at 988.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
88
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The court held that Mr. Markadonatos had standing to bring a
procedural due process claim because he had pled that he was
deprived of $30 without a legally adequate opportunity to challenge
that deprivation.97 Next the court looked to Mr. Markadonatos’
standing to bring a substantive due process claim.98 Unlike the district
court, the Seventh Circuit opinion recognized that Mr. Markadonatos
eventual conviction and adjudication were irrelevant as the fee was
collected on the basis of arrest and not on subsequent guilt.99 However,
the court held that the fact Mr. Markadonatos was a for-cause arrestee
was relevant, and thus Mr. Markadonatos only had standing as an
individual arrested with probable cause.100
The court then analyzed Mr. Markadonatos’ procedural due
process claim using the Eldridge test.101 The Seventh Circuit agreed
with the district court that Mr. Markadonatos had some interest in his
money, even if that interest need only be given minimum weight.102
The Seventh Circuit also agreed with the district court that the risk
of erroneous deprivation was practically non-existent since the fee was
charged to all arrestees regardless of probable cause.103 The court
opined that a Woodridge employee determining whether to charge a
booking fee is presented with a binary choice, if the person was
arrested charge the fee, and if the person was not arrested do not
charge the fee.104 Since the collection of the fee occurred as the
arrestee was being booked, the court said it could not envision any
situation in which a person who was not arrested would be charged the
booking fee.105 Thus, the potential for erroneous deprivation was
practically non-existent.106 The court also noted that any additional
procedures would not reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation and
97

Id.
Id.
99
Id. at 989.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 989-90.
104
Id. at 990.
105
Id.
106
Id.
98
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would be largely meaningless since such a hearing would only need to
establish that the arrestee was arrested and booked.107
Finally, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that
Woodridge had an interest in offsetting costs associated with detaining
arrestees.108 Further, the court noted Woodridge had an interest in
avoiding additional hearings before or after taking the fee because
such administrative procedure would entail substantial additional
costs.109
Upon balancing the Eldridge factors, the court held that
Woodridge’s interest in covering booking costs outweighed Mr.
Markadonatos’ interest in his $30, especially when considering the low
likelihood of erroneous deprivation.110 The court noted that this
holding was consistent with the opinions of other circuits which have
determined that routine accounting and deduction of fees from
detainees is not constitutionally problematic due to the low amount of
discretion and minimal risk of error.111 Additionally, although the
ordinance didn’t formally provide an opportunity to challenge the fee
or seek reimbursement, the court opined that an arrestee could argue to
the arresting officer or later to a judge that the fee should not be
charged to them or should be returned.112 Finally, the court noted that
even if there was some potential for erroneous deprivation, for
example in instances of false arrest, other state remedies were
available to address such wrongs under which arrestees would be
entitled to the return of their booking fee.113
107

Id.
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 991.
111
Id. (citing to Sickles v. Campbell Cnty, 501 F.3d 726 (6th Cir. 2007); Slade
v. Hampton Rds. Reg’l Jail, 407 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2005); Tillman v. Lebanon City
Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2000)). However, the court failed to mention
that Sickles and Tillman dealt with inmates who had already been convicted and thus
had already received adequate procedural due process, and Slade dealt with pretrial
detainees who were entitled to a refund if acquitted of charges.
112
Id.
113
Id. (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); Doherty v. City of
Chicago, 75 F.3d 318 (7th Cir. 1996)). Here the court failed to note that these cases
108
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Moving on to the substantive due process claim, the court
reiterated that Mr. Markadonatos only had standing to the extent
Woodridge’s fee applied to him, as a for-cause arrestee.114 The Seventh
Circuit agreed with the district court that a $30 fee was extremely
modest and did not rise to the level of a fundamental right.115
Therefore, the court needed only to determine if Woodridge’s booking
fee was rational and not arbitrary.116
The court held that Woodridge’s fee passed the rational basis
117
test. First, offsetting costs of booking arrestees was a legitimate
state interest.118 Second, collecting fees from for-cause arrestees was
rationally related to that goal as it took the fee from the individuals
whose actions created the cost.119
Therefore, the court held that Woodridge’s booking fee did not
violate procedural or substantive due process and affirmed the district
court’s decision.120
2. Judge Sykes’ Concurring Opinion
Judge Sykes’ concurring opinion specifically pointed out that the
crux of Mr. Markadonatos’ substantive due process claim was that it
applied to everyone arrested regardless of whether the arrest was
lawful or resulted in criminal prosecution.121 Judge Sykes agreed with
the district court that Mr. Markadonatos lacked standing to claim the
booking fee was substantively unconstitutional because it applied to
dealt with deprivation caused by a state employee’s random, unauthorized conduct.
“Hudson represent[s] a special case of the general Mathews v. Eldridge analysis, in
which postdeprivation tort remedies are all the process that is due, simply because
they are the only remedies the State could be expected to provide.” Zinermon v.
Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128 (1990).
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 992.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.

323
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol10/iss2/4

16

Fox: Procedural Error? Seventh Circuit Fails to Recognize “No Procedur

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 10, Issue 2

Spring 2015

all arrested persons, whether or not the arrest was lawful, since Mr.
Markadonatos admitted he was lawfully arrested.122
Judge Sykes characterized Judge Hamilton’s dissent as believing
that the booking fee was a criminal fine that required some sort of
criminal prosecution before being applied.123 Judge Sykes believed
that this argument was about the content of Woodridge’s ordinance and
thus was a substantive challenge to the village’s policy.124 While she
agreed such a claim would be valid, she maintained that Mr.
Markadonatos lacked the standing to bring such a claim due to his
arrest for-cause.125
3. Judge Hamilton’s Dissenting Opinion
Judge Hamilton’s dissent argued splitting the claim into both
procedural and substantive due process claims had unnecessarily
complicated the case.126 Judge Hamilton also opined that the majority
was confusing standing with the merits.127 He argued that making the
fee payable upon conviction, after the full procedural protections of
the criminal justice system, did not indicate a substantive issue as
Judge Sykes believed, but was simply a correction to a facially
unconstitutional law.128
Judge Hamilton opined that the Eldridge framework requires any
booking fee to await the outcome of a criminal prosecution.129 Under
Woodridge’s ordinance, the final deprivation of property was based on
the decision of a single police officer.130 Thus, the fundamental due
process violation inherent in Woodridge’s ordinance giving one police
officer the power to inflict property deprivation could not be explained
122

Id. at 993.
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 994.
130
Id.
123
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away by using the Eldridge balancing test.131 The majority’s
application of the Eldridge test provided circular logic: because the fee
is imposed on all arrestees, there is no need for procedure because
there is essentially no risk of error.132 The majority’s analysis erred
because they failed to appreciate that the booking fee was in essence a
criminal fine.133
Judge Hamilton opined that the Eldridge framework required any
booking fee await the outcome of a criminal prosecution.134 Applying
the Eldridge test, first, Judge Hamilton stated a person’s interest in
their property is protected regardless of the amount.135 Second, the risk
of erroneous deprivation is substantial because the pivotal decision
that imposes the deprivation of property is a lone police officer’s
decision to arrest.136 Judge Hamilton pointed out that in no other
context, even a minor speeding ticket, is a police officer able to
impose a fine without judicial review.137 Finally, Woodridge’s interest
can only be in charging the booking fee to individuals convicted of a
crime.138 Since the fee is charged at the time of arrest regardless of
conviction, Woodridge’s interest evaporates.139 Additionally, the cost
for Woodridge to await the outcome of criminal charges before
imposing the fee would be marginal.140
Judge Hamilton then addressed Judge Sykes opinion that Mr.
Markadonatos’ claim is correctly categorized as a substantive due
process claim.141 Substantive due process does not prevent the
government from imposing a fine or fee, including a booking fee, as
part of a punishment for a crime.142 However, as Judge Hamilton
131

Id.
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 995.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 995-96.
142
Id. at 995.
132
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pointed out, the issue in this case is the lack of procedure in imposing
that fine.143 Judge Hamilton’s objection was not with the content of
Woodridge’s ordinance because it imposed a fee, but with the content
of the ordinance because it denied procedural protection.144
The basic principle of due process is that a person may not be
punished for a crime until a neutral fact-finder determines that the
elements of the crime have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.145
The proof happens through the processes of the criminal justice
system, and not when a police officer makes an arrest.146 An officer is
not entitled to impose judgment and punishment.147 However,
Woodridge’s booking fee allows an officer to impose just such a
punishment.148 As the district court and majority opinion noted, the
governmental interest is in recovering administrative costs of booking
from the individuals whose actions caused the costs.149 By assuming
that the arrestee’s actions caused the cost, the majority essentially
assumes that the arrestee is guilty of the crime, bypassing the question
to be decided in the criminal justice process.150
As Judge Hamilton pointed out, the majority failed to explain why
Mr. Markadonatos’ for-cause arrest was relevant when such
circumstances do not matter under Woodridge’s ordinance.151 Since
every arrestee is deprived of their property at the moment of booking,
and since there is no provision in the law for further process or postdeprivation remedy, every arrestee’s right not to be deprived of
property without due process is violated at the moment of booking,
regardless of whether the arrest was with or without probable cause.152
Although probable cause is a complete defense to a federal
143

Id.
Id. at 996.
145
Id. (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508
U.S. 275 (1993)).
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 997.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
144
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constitutional claim for wrongful seizure of a person and a state law
claim for false arrest, courts have never suggested that probable cause
is a sufficient basis for imposing a criminal fine without the further
procedural protections of the criminal justice system.153
Additionally, Judge Hamilton disagreed with the majority that
other state post-deprivation remedies may be sufficient to satisfy due
process.154 Judge Hamilton pointed to Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co.155, which held that a post-deprivation remedy did not satisfy due
process where the property deprivation was effected pursuant to
established government procedures.156 Judge Hamilton also noted that
the amount of property taken was too modest for any other remedy to
be meaningful without the help of a class action.157 The filing fee
alone for a modest civil claim in the DuPage County courts is $150.158
Thus, Judge Hamilton explained that when properly understood
Woodridge’s booking fee violated the due process rights of all
arrestees, and he voted to reverse the judgment of the district court and
remand for further proceedings.159
D. Seventh Circuit’s Rehearing en Banc
After losing on appeal, Mr. Markadonatos petitioned for rehearing
en banc and his petition was granted.160 Five judges voted to affirm the
judgment of the district court.161 Judge Sykes voted to remand with
instructions to dismiss for want of standing to sue.162 The remaining
four judges voted to reverse.163 Since no position commanded a
153

Id.
Id.
155
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
156
Markadonatos III, 739 F.3d at 998.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 1001.
160
Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge (Markadonatos IV), 760 F.3d 545, 546
(7th Cir. 2014).
161
Id. at 545.
162
Id.
163
Id.
154
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majority, the judgment of the district court was affirmed by the divided
court.164
1. Judge Posner’s Concurring Opinion
Judge Posner, joined by Judges Flaum and Kanne, voted to affirm
the judgment of the district court.165 Although both Mr. Markadonatos
and Woodridge interpreted the ordinance to mean that a person must
pay a $30 fee if they are arrested or, alternatively, if they post bail or
bond in respect of some other form of legal process, Judge Posner
argued that this was not the correct interpretation of the ordinance.166
The language of the ordinance read that a person must pay the fee
“when posting bail or bond on any legal process, civil or criminal, or
any custodial arrest including warrant.”167 Judge Posner argued this to
mean that an individual must only pay when posting bail or bond in
connection with any legal process, including a custodial arrest.168
Judge Posner admitted that this interpretation makes the “custodial
arrest” clause of the ordinance redundant, but he attributed this to poor
draftsmanship.169
In reaching this opinion, Judge Posner pointed to Supreme Court
precedent decisions regarding avoidance of statutory interpretations
that raise serious constitutional issues.170 In the words of Justice
Holmes, “the rule is settled that as between two possible
interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be
unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that
which will save the Act.”171
164

Id.
Id.
166
Id. at 548.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring); Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
171
Blodgett, 275 U.S. at 148 (Holmes, J., concurring).
165
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Judge Posner argued that the fee was not a booking fee for
individuals who were arrested, but instead was a governmental service
fee for the benefit bestowed upon an individual who used the bail or
bond system to avoid spending time in jail.172 Judge Posner noted that
it was too late to save the ordinance by invoking the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance since Woodridge had already repealed it.173
Judge Posner also admitted that using this interpretation may raise
serious questions concerning the conduct of the Woodridge police if
they were indeed charging the $30 fee to individuals who were
arrested and did not post bail or bond, and that such individuals may
have state or federal remedies available.174 However, Judge Posner
pointed out that Mr. Markadonatos posted bond and was released, and
therefore, he was not a victim of Woodridge’s policy outside of the
ordinance.175 Additionally, Mr. Markadonatos only challenged the
ordinance and not the policy that existed apart from it.176
Since Judge Posner’s interpretation rendered the ordinance
constitutional, it left no basis for Mr. Markadonatos’ claim.177 Judge
Posner admitted the Seventh Circuit had no authority to give a state
statute or local ordinance a definitive interpretation, but it remained
the court’s duty to foresee as best they could the interpretation that the
state courts would adopt.178
Thus, Judge Posner opined that the case was properly dismissed
on the pleadings, because the ground for the dismissal was the answer
to a question of law.179

172

Markadonatos IV, 760 F.3d at 547.
Id. at 550.
174
Id. at 551.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 551-52.
178
Id. at 552.
179
Id.
173
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2. Judge Easterbrook’s Concurring Opinion
Judge Easterbrook, joined by Judge Tinder, concurred in the
judgment to affirm the judgment of the district court.180 Judge
Easterbrook agreed with Judge Sykes that Mr. Markadonatos lacked
standing to contest the application of the ordinance to persons arrested
without probable cause.181 However, Judge Easterbrook declined to
join Judge Sykes’ opinion, which voted to dismiss the entire suit for
want of justiciable controversy, because Mr. Markadonatos had
standing to contest the ordinance’s application to a person arrested
with probable cause.182
First, Judge Easterbrook acknowledged that if forced to make an
independent assessment of the ordinance’s meaning, he would agree
with Judge Posner.183 However, Judge Easterbrook pointed out that
only a state court can give an authoritative limiting construction to a
local ordinance, and the Seventh Circuit’s task is to resolve the dispute
brought before them.184 Since both parties agree that the ordinance
imposed a fee on all arrests, the only justiciable subject is whether the
Constitution allows the ordinance’s application to someone arrested
with probable cause.185
Next, Judge Easterbrook noted that probable cause justifies
substantial burdens.186 Thus, a $30 fee is not constitutionally excessive
180

Id.
Id. at 553. (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982) (“[A]
person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that
statute on the ground that it may conceivable be applied unconstitutionally to others
in situations not before the Court.”)).
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id. (citing Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (Someone arrested
with probable cause can be taken to the stationhouse, booked, and held pending bail,
even if the offense is punishable only by fine); Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S.
44 (1991) (A person arrested with probable cause can be held as long as 48 hours
before seeing a magistrate); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (Probable
cause reflected in a grand jury’s indictment justifies holding a defendant in custody
pending trial); Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090 (2014) (Probable cause can
181
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in light of deprivations of liberty allowable under arrests with probable
cause.187 Although the Due Process Clause applies to both liberty and
property, when there is a distinction, property receives less
protection.188
Judge Easterbrook failed to recognize any procedural due process
claim, noting that Mr. Markadonatos may have been entitled to a
hearing (or other informal process) adequate to separate persons
arrested with probable cause from persons arrested without.189
However, since Mr. Markadonatos maintained that the ordinance
imposes a fee on every arrest, making probable cause irrelevant, and
Mr. Markadonatos concedes his arrest, there is nothing to hold a
hearing about.190 Thus, Judge Easterbrook opined that Mr.
Markadonatos’ argument is correctly identified as a substantive due
process issue.191
Judge Easterbrook went on to note that Mr. Markadonatos does
not have a fundamental right in his $30.192 Judge Easterbrook states
that Washington v. Glucksberg193 separates the domains of equal
protection and substantive due process.194 Since Mr. Markadonatos
does not have a fundamental right in his $30, the equal protection
question in this matter is whether it is possible to imagine a rational
basis for the ordinance.195 Judge Easterbrook notes that arrestees may
justify the seizure of the suspect’s assets pending forfeiture, thus making it
impossible for the suspect to hire his preferred lawyer and might lead to a
conviction, when a better defense could have produced an acquittal)).
187
Id. at 553-54.
188
Id. at 554. (Criminal trials require a burden of “beyond a reasonable doubt,”
whereas civil trials require only a “preponderance of the evidence,” and defendants
are entitled to counsel at public expense in a criminal trial if they cannot afford a
lawyer, whereas a defendant in a civil trial must represent themselves.)
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
194
Markadonatos IV, 760 F.3d at 555.
195
Id. at 554.
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be released without charge, released on bail, or incarcerated, but any
of those options would similarly cost Woodridge at least $30 in terms
of paperwork and compensation for police officers.196 Judge
Easterbrook states that requiring individuals to reimburse others for
the costs they impose is rational.197
Judge Easterbrook concluded that Mr. Markadonatos had standing
to challenge the collection of a fee from a person arrested with
probable cause, but that his argument failed on the merits.198
Therefore, Judge Easterbrook concurred in the judgment to affirm the
judgment of the district court.199
3. Judge Sykes’ Dissenting Opinion
Judge Sykes summarized the different opinions of the en banc
court by noting that they could not agree on what questions this case
raised, whether Mr. Markadonatos was the right person to raise them,
whether they had been properly preserved, or what doctrinal
framework applied.200 Judge Sykes maintained that Mr. Markadonatos
lacked standing on the key substantive aspect of his due process claim,
that it is irrational to impose the fee on individuals wrongly arrested,
since Mr. Markadonatos was not wrongly arrested.201 Additionally,

196

Id. at 555.
Id. Judge Easterbrook notes that when a person is arrested with probable
cause their own misconduct is the cause of the costs incurred by Woodridge.
However, this conclusion is wholly untrue and unsupported. Take for example an
individual who is arrested for matching the description of a known burglar, however
soon after his arrest the actual burglar is caught and the originally arrestee is
released. Such an arrest would still fall under probable cause. But what misconduct
has the arrestee done to cause the costs incurred in his arrest? Is it now misconduct
simply to look too much like someone else? Judge Easterbrook fails to answer, or
even acknowledge these questions.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 556.
201
Id.
197
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Judge Sykes now believed that Mr. Markadonatos lacked standing on
the procedural due process claim as well.202
Judge Sykes stated that Mr. Markadonatos conflated the
procedural and substantive aspects of his due process claim in his
initial brief on appeal.203 Mr. Markadonatos argued the fee was
procedurally unconstitutional because it was collected without a predeprivation hearing to test the validity of the arrest or a postdeprivation process by which individuals wrongfully arrested, never
charged, or found not guilty could obtain a refund.204 Judge Sykes
opined that the way Mr. Markadonatos framed his procedural claim
required a prior conclusion about the substance of the ordinance.205
Judge Sykes explained that because the ordinance did not make the fee
contingent on a valid arrest or successful prosecution, in order to
resolve the argument about inadequate procedural process the court
had to first conclude that the booking fee was substantively
unconstitutional as applied to people who are wrongfully arrested,
never charged, or found not guilty.206 However, Mr. Markadonatos
isn’t in any of those groups, as he was arrested with probable cause,
was charged with retail theft, and pleaded guilty as charged.207
Judge Sykes noted that Mr. Markadonatos’ arguments had evolved
during the course of the appeal, but essentially he maintained three
possible reasons why the booking fee ordinance should be found
unconstitutional: first, the fee was collected without a pre-deprivation
hearing or post-deprivation process to obtain a refund; second, the fee
was arbitrary and irrational as applied to individuals unlawfully
arrested; and third, the fee was arbitrary and irrational as applied to
individuals who were never charged or were found not guilty.208 The

202

Id.
Id. at 557.
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 559.
203
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first argument is about procedure, and the other two arguments address
the substantive terms of the ordinance.209
Judge Sykes opined since Mr. Markadonatos conceded probable
cause to arrest and admitted his guilt in court, he lacks standing to
bring the substantive due process claim as it pressed an argument that
the fee was irrational as applied to innocent or wrongfully arrested
individuals.210
Additionally, Judge Sykes summarized Mr. Markadonatos’
procedural claim as arguing that because the fee was not rational as
applied to those who are wrongfully arrested, never charged, or found
not guilty, a hearing is needed to prevent erroneous application to
individuals in those groups.211 Judge Sykes opined that since Mr.
Markadonatos was not a member of any of these groups, he had failed
to prove the second element of standing because he had not suffered a
harm that was fairly traceable to the alleged deprivation of procedure
about which he complained.212
Judge Sykes disagreed with Judge Easterbrook’s opinion that Mr.
Markadonatos had standing to contest the ordinance’s application to a
person arrested with probable cause under substantive due process
because Mr. Markadonatos had never argued that the booking fee was
arbitrary and irrational in all circumstances, but instead, he had only
argued that the fee could not be rationally applied to persons
wrongfully arrested or innocent.213
209

Id.
Id.
211
Id. Assuming this is an accurate summarization of Mr. Markadonatos’
procedural due process argument, Judge Sykes opinion had some merit to the extent
that Mr. Markadonatos’ counsel poorly constructed the procedural argument and
caused it to become unnecessarily entangled with the substantive argument. The
proper issue under a procedural argument does not depend on whether the fee is
rational. A perfectly rational fee could still violate procedural due process if the
procedures in place in obtaining the fee failed the Eldridge test. Of course, since
each opinion presented by the Seventh Circuit in this matter interprets Mr.
Markadonatos’ argument differently it is hard to rely on any one interpretation or
summarization of his argument.
212
Id.
213
Id. at 562.
210
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Judge Sykes turned next to Judge Hamilton’s analysis on
standing.214 Judge Hamilton argued that Mr. Markadonatos, and
everyone else who paid the booking fee, may challenge it simply by
virtue of having paid it and that the arrestee’s personal circumstances
do not matter.215 Judge Sykes admitted that Judge Hamilton’s analysis
would be true for a facial constitutional challenge.216 However, Judge
Sykes failed to recognize Mr. Markadonatos’ facial challenge to the
ordinance under procedural due process, and instead believed both
dimensions of Mr. Markadonatos’ due process claim rest on the
substantive premise that the fee is irrational as applied to individuals
wrongfully arrested or innocent.217
Judge Sykes voted to vacate and remand with instructions to
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction because Mr. Markadonatos
lacked standing to bring the claims actually raised.218
4. Judge Hamilton’s Dissenting Opinion
Judge Hamilton pointed out that his opinion shares common
ground with Judge Posner’s in that both agreed, and thus a majority of
the court agreed, that Mr. Markadonatos had standing to challenge the
booking fee.219 Their disagreement lied in Judge Posner’s decision not
to decide the case presented.220 Judge Hamilton states that Mr.
Markadonatos alleged in his complaint that his rights were violated by
Woodridge’s actual policy, whether or not that policy complied with
the ordinance.221 Further, there was no dispute between the parties that
Woodridge imposed the booking fee on everyone arrested, and that the
214

Id.
Id.
216
Id. (citing Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F. 3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011).
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Id. at 563.
220
Id.
221
Id. This is in direct conflict with Judge Posner’s argument that Mr.
Markadonatos challenged only the ordinance and not the policy.
215
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fee was not related to the bail process.222 Judge Hamilton pointed out
that Judge Posner had transformed an unconstitutional fee for going
into jail into an administrative fee for getting out of jail.223 Judge
Hamilton opined that the court should decide the case the parties
actually presented.224
Judge Hamilton noted that Judge Posner’s transformation of the
case ignores the most basic constraint in deciding a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim, to treat as true the factual allegations in the
plaintiff’s complaint.225 Mr. Markadonatos’ complaint alleged a policy
and practice of imposing the fee based solely on the fact of arrest in
violation of the Constitution.226 Judge Hamilton pointed to the direct
language of Mr. Markadonatos’ complaint,227 Mr. Markadonatos’
counsel’s oral argument stating the money paid for release on bond
was different from the booking fee, and a receipt228 attached to the
complaint as facts showing that the fee imposed was for arrest and not
for release on bail.229 Additionally, Woodridge never disputed that the
booking fee was triggered by arrest.230 Judge Hamilton opined that Mr.
Markadonatos alleged a set of facts that present a viable claim for
damages for violation of his federal constitutional rights by reason of
municipal policy and that the viability of the claim does not depend on

222

Id.
Id.
224
Id.
225
Id. at564.
226
Id.
227
"The booking fee policy is procedurally and substantively unconstitutional."
Id. (quoting Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint ¶ 1) (emphasis added).
228
“You are hereby notified that under Village Ordinance #5-1-12, an
administrative fee of $30.00 is required upon completion of any custodial
arrest/booking procedure. The Complainant named above by its Police Officer, on
oath states that you were arrested on: [date of arrest, name, date of birth, and
address].” Id. (quoting the text of the receipt).
229
Id.
230
Id. at 565.
223
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whether the court can interpret the ordinance better than Woodridge
administered it.231
Judge Hamilton further noted that constitutional avoidance was
incorrectly applied by Judge Posner because Mr. Markadonatos was
not seeking injunctive or declaratory relief about how Woodridge
should administer the ordinance going forward, but he was seeking
damages for an unconstitutional policy practiced in the past.232
Further, Judge Hamilton noted that Judge Posner failed to cite any
cases using the doctrine of constitutional avoidance in this context,
and properly understood, constitutional avoidance is a mechanism for
saving legislation for the future, not a device for wishing away past
violations of constitutional rights.233
Judge Hamilton looked next at the merits of Woodridge’s
policy.234 Judge Hamilton noted the deprivations occurred at the time
of arrest.235 The ordinance allowed no room for dispute or review.236
The deprivation occurred based on only the say-so, and perhaps even
the whim, of one arresting officer regardless of whether the arrestee
was ever prosecuted or convicted, and regardless of whether the arrest
was lawful.237
Judge Hamilton opined that the due process violation in this case
was more fundamental than even procedural or substantive.238 The
booking fee denies due process because it imposes a permanent
deprivation of property based on the unreviewable decision of one
police office.239 Even parking tickets are subject to administrative and
judicial review.240 However, Woodridge’s booking fee provided neither
231

Id.
Id. at 566.
233
Id.
234
Id. at 567.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Id.
232

337
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol10/iss2/4

30

Fox: Procedural Error? Seventh Circuit Fails to Recognize “No Procedur

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 10, Issue 2

Spring 2015

process nor law in any recognizable form.241 Judge Hamilton
compared the booking fee to a fee a police officer might charge merely
for subjecting an individual to a traffic stop, a breathalyzer test, or a
Terry stop and frisk.242 All of these types of fees would be
unacceptable because they impose the will of the government on the
people arbitrarily.243 Supreme Court due process jurisprudence has
long reflected that the Due Process Clause was “intended to secure the
individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.”244
A fee based on the unreviewable say-so of one police officer is an
arbitrary deprivation of property.245 Judge Hamilton opined that if the
theory is that the arrestee has done something criminal to justify the
arrest, and therefore the fee, then that question must be answered
through the due process provided by the criminal justice system.246
Finally, in regards to standing, Judge Hamilton points out that
Judge Sykes’ opinion confuses the merits of the plaintiff’s claim with
his standing to bring it.247 Standing is an inquiry separate from the
merits and is not a difficult hurdle to clear.248 All that must be alleged
is an injury, personal to the person seeking judicial relief, which the
court can redress.249 In the present matter, Mr. Markadonatos suffered
an injury when Woodridge took his $30.250 Mr. Markadonatos alleged
the money was taken pursuant to Woodridge’s unconstitutional policy
of collecting the money from all arrestees.251 And a court could redress
Mr. Markadonatos’ injury by finding the policy unconstitutional and
241
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awarding damages.252 This is all that is needed to require standing.253
Standing does not depend on whether Mr. Markadonatos will
ultimately prevail on the constitutional claim nor does it depend on
whether Woodridge could have justified the fee under a different
policy or ordinance that has not been alleged by Mr. Markadonatos or
supported by the pleadings.254
Judge Hamilton opined that Judge Sykes, like Judge Posner,
attempted to resolve the case by hypothesizing a different municipal
practice or ordinance than the one alleged.255 Judge Hamilton
summarized Judge Sykes reasoning as believing that since Woodridge
could have charged the fee upon conviction Mr. Markadonatos lost
standing to challenge Woodridge’s actual policy of charging all
arrestees at the time of arrest the moment he entered a guilty plea.256
Judge Sykes’ attempt to rewrite Woodridge’s policy using standing is
no more appropriate than rewriting the policy using constitutional
avoidance.257 Under Woodridge’s policy, the due process violation
occurred at the moment the arrestee was brought to jail and paid the
fee for no other reason than his or her arrest.258 At that moment, Mr.
Markadonatos, or any other arrestee, had a ripe due process claim.259
Anything that happened after that moment is irrelevant to the
constitutional question.260
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III. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ADOPTED JUDGE HAMILTON’S
ANALYSIS
A. Procedural or Substantive Issue
A substantial amount of discussion in this case revolved around
the issue of whether Mr. Markadonatos’ claim is properly categorized
as a procedural due process claim or a substantive due process claim.
Woodridge attempted to use this to their advantage by adopting a
strategy of divide-and-conquer.261 If the claim was limited to a
procedural due process theory, Woodridge defended its lack of
procedural process on the theory that there was no serious chance of
erroneous deprivation.262 If the claim was limited to a substantive due
process theory, Woodridge argued that Mr. Markadonatos had no
fundamental right in such a modest amount of money.263
In Judge Hamilton’s dissent to the en banc opinion, he argued that
since the policy surrounding the booking fee lacked any procedure
whatsoever, other than the unreviewable say-so of one police officer,
that the policy raised a due process issue that was more fundamental
then either procedural or substantive due process.264 At its heart, the
Due Process Clause is intended to secure individuals from the arbitrary
exercise of the powers of government.265 If such a fundamental due
process violation can potentially slip through the cracks of procedural
and substantive due process then perhaps some new test is needed.
However, what seems more likely is that the procedural due process
analysis was misapplied by the district court, that Mr. Markadonatos
caused his claim to become unnecessarily confusing by adding the
substantive due process claim, and that the proper analysis under the
procedural claim was the one championed by Judge Hamilton in his
dissent to the panel opinion.
261
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Judge Hamilton’s dissent to the panel opinion argued that since
the booking fee was charged without any procedure whatsoever, it
raised a procedural due process issue by its very nature and that the
substantive due process issue was nothing more than a detour to
distract from the procedural issue.

B. “No Procedure” is Not “Adequate Procedure” Under the Due
Process Clause
As the Supreme Court noted in Eldridge, the purpose of the
procedural due process test is to determine if administrative
procedures are constitutionally sufficient.266 The lack of any
administrative procedure in the face of the deprivation of property
surely cannot be considered constitutionally sufficient or adequate.
In Roehl v. City of Naperville,267 a similar ordinance in Naperville,
requiring a $50 booking fee, was examined.268 The Naperville
ordinance did not establish any pre or post-deprivation procedures.269
The plaintiff, Mr. Roehl, was arrested and charged for driving under
the influence of alcohol, was charged the booking fee, and later, was
found not guilty and released from jail.270 Mr. Roehl filed a complaint
alleging the ordinance violated his procedural due process rights and
Naperville filed a motion to dismiss.271
In applying the first factor of the Eldridge test, the court noted
that Mr. Roehl’s property interest in $50 was minimal for substantially
similar reasons to those alluded to in Markadonatos I.272

266

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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The court then moved to the third Eldridge factor, the
governmental interest, noting that the analysis of the government’s
interest would inform the discussion on the second Eldridge factor, the
risk of erroneous deprivation.273
The Roehl, court realized that the governmental interest varies
based on the arrestee.274 On one end of the spectrum the government
has a strong interest in recovering costs from individuals ultimately
found guilty, because the governmental costs are incurred due to their
illegal conduct.275 However, on the other end of the spectrum the
government has a weak interest, and possibly no interest, in charging
booking fees to arrestees who are arrested on invalid warrants
(warrants that had been quashed but not yet removed from the system),
individuals wrongly arrested because they were incorrectly identified
as a person sought on a valid warrant, and individuals ultimately
dismissed because there was an absence of probable cause for the
arrest.276
Finally, the Roehl court looked at the second Eldridge factor, the
risk of erroneous deprivation and probable value of substitute
procedural safeguards.277 The court admitted that since the fee was
charged to all arrestees the likelihood of erroneous deprivation to a
non-arrestee is virtually zero.278 However, since the ordinance
provided no procedural safeguards to permit arrestees to challenge the
fee, there is a one hundred percent chance that someone who should
not have been arrested but was will be erroneously deprived.279 The
court then determined the probable value of substitute procedural
safeguards.280 The court noted that it was the presence or absence of
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additional safeguards that is important to the Eldridge analysis.281 The
court pointed to numerous cases that held that additional safeguards
were not needed when adequate procedures were already in place.282
The court could not hold, as a matter of law, that Naperville’s
ordinance satisfied procedural due process since it failed to provide
any procedural mechanism whatsoever.283
This is the correct analysis under the Eldridge test. As noted in
Roehl, there are numerous situations where an individual could be
arrested when they should not be.284 This includes situations where an
individual is arrested with probable cause but due to no fault of their
own.285
The holding by the district court in Markadonatos I implied that
since the fee was charged to all arrestees regardless of probable cause
or eventual guilt, the action of charging the fee to an individual who
was wrongfully arrested or innocent of any crime would not be
erroneous deprivation.286 However, that line of reasoning is incorrect
because it fails to recognize that Woodridge’s interest could not apply
to all arrestees equally. This is what Judge Hamilton meant when he
opined that Woodridge’s interest could only be in charging the booking
281
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fee to individuals convicted of a crime or else its interest would
evaporate.287 Since Woodridge cannot have any governmental interest
in charging booking fees to individuals that it wrongfully arrested, any
depravation from such individuals would be erroneous. Thus, just as
Naperville’s ordinance could not be held to satisfy procedural due
process because it failed to provide any procedural mechanism
whatsoever, Woodridge’s policy which similarly fails to provide any
procedural mechanism whatsoever should not have been held to
satisfy procedural due process.
This is where Judge Sykes attempted to argue that Mr.
Markadonatos lacked standing because he was not an individual who
was wrongfully arrested or innocent.288 However, having removed the
unnecessary substantive due process claim, this procedural claim is
now clearly a facial constitutional challenge and individual application
facts do not matter.289
CONCLUSION
No Supreme Court opinion has ever held that government
deprivation of a private interest in the absence of any pre or postdeprivation procedures, or other safeguards, is acceptable procedural
due process. Woodridge’s ordinance and corresponding policy failed to
provide any procedural mechanism whatsoever, and thus, the Seventh
Circuit should have held that there was an adequate claim against
Woodridge for violating Mr. Markadonatos’ procedural due process
rights.
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